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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the changing nature of knowledge-based innovation 
systems in light of the dynamic interconnections between the university, 
industry and government. Industries have to assess in what way and to what 
extent they decide to internalize R&D functions. Universities position 
themselves in markets, both regionally and globally. Governments make 
informed trade-offs between investments in industrial policies, S&T policies, 
and/or delicate and balanced interventions at the structural level. Such policies 
can be expected to be successful insofar as one can anticipate and/or follow 
trends according to the dynamics of the new technologies in their different 
phases. The evolutionary perspective in economics can be complemented with 
a turn towards reflexivity in sociology in order to obtain a richer 
understanding of how the overlay of communications in university-industry-
government relations reshapes the systems of innovations that are currently 
subjects of debate, policy-making, and scientific study. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Various scholars have proposed categories for the analysis of the ongoing changes in 
research and innovation systems. Gibbons et al. (1994), for example, distinguished between 
‘Mode 1’ and ‘Mode 2’ in the production of scientific knowledge. ‘Mode 1’ research can be 
considered as disciplinarily organized, while ‘Mode 2’ research is mainly legitimated and 
organized with reference to contexts of application. Other policy analysts have argued that 
systems of innovation can no longer be stabilized nationally, since they remain fundamentally 
in transition (e.g., Cozzens et al.1990). Rip and Van der Meulen (1996) proposed the concept 
of a ‘post-modern research system’ to describe S&T policy systems.  
What generates this lack of consensus about the appropriate unit of analysis in the 
study of technology and innovation? National systems of innovation (Lundvall 1988; Nelson 
1993) have been particularly studied because of their relevance for government policies 
(Nelson 1982; Irvine & Martin 1984; Freeman 1987). Or should one consider ‘Research, 
Technology, & Development’ (RTD) systems as an increasingly steady state (Ziman 1994)? 
Sometimes various claims are made within a single text or the contradicting statements are 
sometimes combined in edited volumes.  
In my opinion, the various metaphors in the study of knowledge-based innovation 
systems can be considered as theoretical appreciations of a complex dynamics from different 
perspectives and with potentially different objectives. The analysts attempt to stabilize a 
picture by choosing a perspective. Since the systems under study are developing dynamically, 
the metaphors remain ‘out of focus’ when viewed from one window of appreciation or 
another. The illusion of a stable object, however, may enable policy advisors to legitimate 
S&T policies.  
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Innovation is not a stable unit of analysis, since it operates at an interface by 
definition. One is able to provide reflections on this operation from different angles and/or at 
different moments in time. The various story lines illustrate the symmetry breaches at the 
relevant interfaces reflexively. From this meta-perspective, knowledge-based developments 
can be considered as systems that are discursively reconstructed as reflections on specific 
subdynamics (e.g., knowledge production) while at the same time developing in interaction 
with other subsystems of society (e.g., diffusion at the market). The dynamics of such non-
linear interactions are non-trivial and nearly incommensurable windows of appreciation can 
be expected. In this contribution, I foreground the self-organizing potentials of the complex 
dynamics of innovation and the evolutionary function of the variety of reflections on this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION 
 
While each innovation can be considered as an instance of interaction between 
different subdynamics, innovation systems build recursively on series of interaction terms. 
The recursion in the interaction can be expected to remain partially beyond control—since at 
the (next-order) network level—when analyzed from the perspective of either of the 
subsystems that interact. In other words, the model has to contain both interactive and 
recursive terms at different levels of aggregation and it may operate counter-intuitively. 
In such a non-linear model, intentional input can no longer be expected to lead to 
intended output. The dependency relations themselves can be expected to change when the 
systems under study are further developing. Unintended consequences (e.g., economic 
externalities) can be expected to prevail, while ‘externalities’ emerge in unexpected contexts 
(Callon 1998). Contexts become crucial when consequences can no longer unambiguously be 
related to causes (Barnes and Edge 1982). While policy makers may be able to steer the 
developments in some cases and at some stages, the policy inputs can be expected to remain 
contextual in other instances—for example, when the systems internalize complexity by 
becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive (Van den Daele et al. 1979).  
These externalities of innovation systems can be made visible only reflexively, that is, 
ex post. From this perspective of hindsight, however, the focus of the analysis shifts from the 
social construction of technology (e.g., Bijker et al. 1987) to the appreciation of the complex 
dynamics of innovation within the constructed system. The social construction by agency can 
then be considered as the subdynamics of producing variation, whereas selection is structured 
at other levels.  
Each subdynamics can be made the subject of theoretical reflections by taking a 
perspective or making specific assumptions; for example, about the role of agency or 
structure (Giddens 1984). The theoretical discourses attempt to stabilize a discursive 
representation of one of the interacting subdynamics. In addition to the theoretical task of 
improving on the quality of these theoretical reflections, a methodologist is able to raise 
questions concerning the contingent relations between different forms of appreciative 
theorizing (Leydesdorff 1997). 
The model of evolutionary theorizing in economics, for example, can be recognized 
as providing a meta-biological perspective in which selection environments are often 
considered as ‘given’ for a firm (Andersen 1994). Evolutionary economists have first drawn 
attention to the non-linear interaction terms between market perspectives and technological 
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options (Mowery and Rosenberg 1979; Freeman 1982). From a sociological perspective, 
however, neither selection environments nor technological options are biologically given. All 
interacting subsystems at the social level (technologies, markets, institutions, etc.) have 
discursively been constructed and are continuously reconstructed. 
Nelson (1994) proposed to analyze co-evolutions between technologies and 
institutions in addition to co-evolutions between markets and technologies. However, 
institutional selection operates very differently from the dependency relations between 
technologies and markets (McKelvey 1996). The Triple Helix thesis focuses on the 
interactions among these various interfaces. How are organizational rigidities among the 
helices both organized and dissolved? When can these reorganizations be considered as 
structural adjustments to technological developments (Freeman & Perez 1988)? How does a 
system of innovations build on stability and change? In which phases can change and/or 
stability be expected to prevail, and why? 
The metaphors are needed, since the systems cannot be defined without theorizing. 
They are not given, but historically constructed. Therefore, they can be further refined by 
reflections that are stabilized as theoretical discourse at the social level. The codification of 
these reflections can sometimes be refined when the respective interpretations are disturbed 
by interactions. Thus, the various metaphors function both as evaluation schemes and as 
heuristics. The innovation ‘system’ under study, however, is operational and therefore non-
observable. It remains a knowledge-based assumption.  
When studying innovation systems one becomes increasingly aware of the 
dependency of each analytic perspective on the respective definitions. Changes in definitions 
sometimes provide windows of unexpected opportunities for innovation. Different 
stakeholders (e.g., academia, industry, government) recombine from their respective 
perspectives. Recombinations (that is, knowledge-based innovations and reorganizations) 
may disturb the current discourses to such an extent that new perspectives can be proposed 
and elaborated. 
 
 
EXPECTATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
The institutional arrangements in national systems of innovation compete in terms of 
their respective successes and failures when attempting to grasp the fruits of possible 
innovations, for example, by trading off changes in their structures (transaction costs) against 
historical continuities (routines). The various subdynamics operate upon one another without 
any a priori guarantee of harmonization, but under selection pressure. Order can be expected 
to emerge in one or more directions because of potential resonances between the selecting 
systems. These ‘lock-ins’ remain conditioned and constrained by the historical configurations 
(David 1985; Arthur 1988, 1989, and 1994).  
When and where do the emerging conditions fit into each other, and to what extent? 
The metaphor of an overlay of mutual expectations and exchange relations enables us to 
analyze these complex dynamics as a result of the interaction among the various 
subdynamics, while each of the subdynamics can also be expected to operate recursively on 
the basis of their previous state. Note that the differentiation is continuously reproduced 
because the innovative integration at an interface is by definition partial. The differentiation 
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is perhaps changed, but then reconstructed so that new rounds of innovative interfacing 
remain possible. 
Furthermore, the analyst may act as a participant (recursively implied) and/or as an 
external observer. One is additionally able to change one’s perspective, for example, when 
giving normative advice. Corresponding to this double perspective of analyst and participant 
(Giddens 1976), the emerging overlay can be considered by each actor as subsystemic (that 
is, as an interface within a system) and/or as supersystemic (that is, as a factor in the system’s 
environment). While a supersystemic factor provides a relevant environment for the system 
of reference, each participant can also be implied in the (re-) construction of the overlay by 
reflecting on his or her environment. Thus, a double perspective of participant and observer is 
reflexively reinforced and knowledge-based learning processes are then induced (Leydesdorff 
2001a).  
From this (neo-) evolutionary perspective, the observable social structures can be 
considered as successful cases of previous institutionalization and conflict resolution. The 
structural forces behind the institutionalization and stabilization may remain latent, but they 
can be hypothesized. In the longer term, institutions can be expected to optimize their 
relations with relevant environments (for example, by learning to cope with uncertainties). 
Thus, the knowledge base of these institutions is further developed.  
Institutional functionality in a knowledge-based economy also implies reaching across 
institutional borders on the basis of expectations about how the environments may change 
when providing opportunities for innovation. For example, industries have to assess in what 
way and to what extent they decide to internalize R&D functions. Universities position 
themselves in markets, both regionally and globally. Governments make informed trade-offs 
between investments in industrial policies, S&T policies, and/or delicate and balanced 
interventions at the structural level. Such policies can be expected to be successful insofar as 
one can anticipate and/or follow trends according to the dynamics of the new technologies in 
their different phases (Freeman and Perez 1988; McKelvey 1996; Giesecke 2000). The 
management of these interfaces is both an economic imperative and a political challenge, yet 
knowledge-intensive in the elaboration. 
Is this (neo-) evolutionary model a reappraisal of old-fashioned structural-
functionalism? In my opinion, the Triple Helix model extends the basis of structural-
functionalism by introducing the notion of ‘meaning’ from symbolic interactionism: social 
functions are discursively constructed, and they can be deconstructed and reconstructed 
reflexively. Thus, one can no longer accept a dialectics between ahistorical functions and 
historical institutions. The functions can be expected to (co-) evolve with the discourses and 
the institutions. The institutions are needed to carry out the functions, but they can be 
expected to be changed while doing so. The functions are continuously under reconstruction 
and the institutional elements of the systems have been generated by these recursive 
operations.  
 
 
THE HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION 
 
This neo-evolutionary model is historically reflexive, since the cultural evolution that 
it tries to explain, builds on the achievements of the past. Both layers of the system 
(institutions and functions) have been socially constructed and stabilized, but in different 
periods of time. First, the communications were functionally differentiated as in the 
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individual revolutions of the 16th and 17th century. The transformations of the 18th century 
(‘modernization’) led in the 19th century to the institutional differentiation between the 
modern state and civic society.  
The complex social system builds on the interfaces among both institutions and 
functions as different mechanisms of differentiation. Institutions can be assessed in terms of 
their functionality, and functions can be evaluated in terms of their value for the carrying 
institutions. Functional meanings and institutional meanings can constructively be 
‘translated’ into each other.  
Since the interaction terms are based on reflections and therefore not always readily 
observable, they suppose the declaration of reflexivity as a condition for their discursive 
reconstruction. This discursive reflexivity can always be made more knowledge-intensive and 
science-based. Because of the knowledge-intensity of the communications, one is 
increasingly able to experiment with the interaction terms between structures and functions in 
the organization of social systems. 
I follow the sociological tradition (Marx, Weber, Parsons) in assuming that the 
functional differentiation of society was constructed during the individual revolutions of the 
16th and 17th centuries. Only after the completion of the ‘modern’ system could institutional 
implementation of the ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ system be legitimated as deliberate reform of 
social relations (‘modernization’). Foucault (e.g., 1972) used the term ‘noso-politics’ for this 
reconstruction of society during the Enlightenment of the 18th century.  
The institutional differentiation of the state from civic society followed upon the 
American and French Revolutions and was mainly achieved in the first half of the 19th 
century. This development has led to a variety of nation states with their respective cultures. 
From 1870 onwards, a scientific-technological revolution can subsequently be distinguished, 
gradually shaping a knowledge-based mode of production and distribution at the global level 
(Braverman 1974).  
During this latter process the knowledge production and control functions 
increasingly ceased to be the exclusive domain of academia (Noble 1977). Functions and 
institutions could historically be coupled, but there were no longer determinate relationships 
(Whitley 1984). For example, the American university, to a larger extent than its German 
predecessor, became also an entrepreneurial locus (Etzkowitz 2001). The position of 
government changed from that of a principal agent (‘King’) into that of a controlled 
bureaucracy negotiating an internal trade-off between facilitating further developments at the 
level of society and political accountability (e.g., Van den Belt & Rip 1987; cf. Weber 1922). 
Table One captures the interactions and differentiations between functions and 
institutions in a scheme. In the liberal organization of society, science was first considered as 
a public good, while trade and industrial production were considered private activities. These 
categories became increasingly interchangeable across institutional interfaces with the further 
development of the system. Scientific insights could be made useful in industrial practices 
and industrial (and military) concerns began to guide the heuristics of scientific research 
programs. These reflexive flexibilities, perhaps rooted in American pragmatism, also 
influenced the construction of the European Union after W.W. II, since a variety of 
perspectives must be translated into each other in order to (re-) construct the European 
dimension (cf. Ronge 1979). 
 
 
6     International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 
 
 
Table 1 
The Interaction Between Functional and Institutional Differentiation 
(Since Approximately 1870) 
 
 Functions 
Institutions Science Economy 
Public 
 
Academia; University 
 
Patent legislation; 
Science, technology, and  
innovation policies 
 Private 
 
Industrial R&D labs; 
entrepreneurial universities 
Trade and Industry 
 
 
 
THE CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
 
The new mode of knowledge-based production can be expected to build on the old 
one(s) as its historical basis. Thus, labels like ‘university’, ‘industry,’ and ‘government’ did 
not disappear while constructing the transnational system, but they gradually shifted in 
meaning (Callon and Latour 1981). However, the changes of meaning are not expected to 
imply a loss of differentiation at the level of the systems under reconstruction. The 
differentiation hitherto obtained by the social system provides its complex dynamics with the 
capacity to develop further in response to emerging challenges.  
From this perspective, the established systems and their corresponding discourses 
compete as suboptimal solutions to the problem of organizing and giving meaning to a social 
world (a ‘universe’). One no longer expects a single (optimum) solution based on an 
undifferentiated integration, a common center or a textbook (as in a high culture; cf. 
Yamauchi 1986). One expects local suboptima that explore ‘hill-climbing’ in their relevant 
environments (Kauffman 1993; Allen 1994). Nation systems, for example, can then be 
considered as cultures that compete for a share in the economic developments at the global 
level. 
Since social systems remain distributed by their nature, the institutional hill-climbers 
compete and thereby reshape the distribution of their opportunity structures in relation to one 
another. Thanks to this reshaping, the landscape itself can be expected to change (Scharnhorst 
1998). As in biology, the landscape is rugged with its historical formations. Unlike biology, 
however, Schumpeter’s (1939) ‘creative destruction’ of existing constructions is part of the 
reflexive practices of the hill-climbers.  
In a dialectical model of social evolution a co-evolution between two subdynamics 
(e.g., production forces and production relations) can be hypothesized, but a Triple Helix 
cannot be stabilized or resolved. A model of three helices is sufficiently complex for 
understanding the complex dynamics of the ongoing transformation processes. The (three) 
double helices on which the Triple Helix builds, continuously ‘lock-in’ into local co-
evolutions that are expected to ‘clot’ into provisional solutions shaping the ruggedness of the 
corresponding landscapes.  
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The clots of different sizes perform their own ‘life’-cycles along historical 
‘trajectories’, for example, at the industry level, while the overall landscape can be 
considered as a next-order system forming a ‘regime’ (Dosi 1982). Bifurcations 
endogenously reshape the levels in series of events. The ‘regime’ can be considered as a non-
linear effect of the trajectories, and the ‘trajectories’ are the expected consequences of 
previous lock-ins (Leydesdorff & Van den Besselaar 1998).  
In biology, the rugged fitness landscapes are ‘given’ for the various species and 
provide niches for their survival. In an economy, the niches can be considered as mechanisms 
for the retention of already adapted environments: how is one able to organize an institutional 
arrangement so that wealth and jobs can be generated? These social mechanisms, however, 
can also be deconstructed and reconstructed.  
The solution of local conflicts has hitherto been a central function of the nation states 
and their political economies (Skolnikoff 1993). As the operation of the third helix 
(knowledge) becomes more pronounced in the re-organization of society, it continuously may 
destabilize a click between two other helices. Nelson & Winter (1982), for example, noted 
that technological innovations tend to upset the equilibrating dynamics of the market. The 
market, however, can only be equilibrated within an institutional setting. Destabilization can 
thus be considered as an effect of interactions at the regime level (Freeman and Perez 1988).  
Technologies may ‘click’ with state apparatuses into a local fit, like in the energy 
sector or in health care; industries potentially click with technologies (e.g., David’s (1985) 
QWERTY keyboards and Arthur’s (1988) VHS tapes); and industries can click with the state 
apparatus as in the former Soviet Union. A click excludes a third subdynamic from 
effectively operating, since the co-evolutionary dynamic can then be considered as 
temporarily ‘locked’ (Simon 1969).  
For example, the political economies of Eastern Europe were not sufficiently able to 
make the transition to a knowledge-based economy during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Richta 
et al. 1968). When the Chinese innovation system was confronted with similar problems of 
integration in the late 1980s, one could reflexively choose for a knowledge-based reform of 
the political economy (Leydesdorff and Guoping 2001). 
A lock-in can have local advantages (e.g., increasing marginal returns) and/or global 
disadvantages. A ‘break out’ of a lock-in may open a window on a new market and offer a 
global (that is, next-order) perspective. Sometimes it provides also a niche for developing a 
new discipline. ICT (e.g., Nowak and Grantham 2000) and biotechnology (e.g., McKelvey 
1996) have been considered as examples of global developments. But the risk of crisis is ever 
present given the complexity of the dynamics. As another subdynamic increasingly disturbs a 
local harmonization, the systems can be expected to become ‘critical’, that is, to drift towards 
the edges of chaos and potential bifurcation.  
 
 
THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE TRIPLE HELIX MODEL 
 
Can a reflexive observer grasp the evolutionary momentum and perform the 
adjustments in time? What unintended consequences can be made visible ex ante using the 
available reflections? How large are the expected uncertainties? How can the threats be 
formulated in terms of opportunities? 
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As noted, the differentiations that have been achieved historically, cannot be 
dissolved at the system’s level without costs. A loss of internal complexity, for example, can 
be expected to lead to a loss of ability to handle complexity in the relevant environments 
(e.g., markets). The functional differentiations of knowledge production, wealth creation, and 
governance operate as feedbacks on institutional task divisions among academia, industry, 
and government, and vice versa. However, one can no longer expect a single or pre-given 
(e.g., national) order to prevail: the various subdynamics are juxtaposed. Thus, there is 
always room for improvement, empirical investigation, and change. 
When order can be observed, the analyst is able to hypothesize on theoretical grounds 
how this order was constructed, for example, at the level of nations or sectors. Simulation 
studies enable us to specify the (sometimes counter-intuitive) expectations given historical 
configurations and theoretical assumptions about the relevant subdynamics. However, the 
simulation results require another round of appreciation.  
Although an analyst may be able to specify this uncertainty, the assumption of the 
non-trivial (social) machinery of a Triple Helix with an overlay adds to the uncertainty. For 
example, other players may see options for codification that the analysts could not possibly 
have seen given their necessarily contingent positions as also participants. Reflexivity and 
uncertainty prevail in a knowledge-based economy.  
 Biological evolution theory assumed variation as the driving force and selection to be 
‘naturally’ given. Cultural evolution, however, can be considered as driven and reconstructed 
both by individuals and groups who make conscious decisions and by the appearance of a 
variety of unintended consequences of interactions with which one may have to cope in a 
next stage. Since the sources of innovation in a Triple Helix configuration are not 
synchronized a priori, the possibilities for innovations and rearrangements generate puzzles 
for participants, analysts, and policy-makers alike.  
 This network of reflexive relations operates as a knowledge-intensive subdynamics of 
intentions, strategies, and projects that adds surplus value by reorganizing and harmonizing 
the political and economic structures in order to achieve a better approximation of the variety 
of (uncertain) goals. The issue of how much and under which conditions anyone is in control 
given this layer of interacting expectations specifies a research program for innovation 
studies.  
 In the case of knowledge-based innovation systems the expectation is that ‘what you 
see is not what you get’! What you see, are the historical footprints of previous operations. 
The definition and consequently the delineation of innovation systems is knowledge-
intensive. The interacting subdynamics, that is, specific operations like markets and 
technological innovations, are continuously reconstructed—like e-commerce on the 
Internet—yet differently at different places and various levels. What is considered as 
‘industry’ and what as ‘markets’ cannot be taken for granted and should not be reified. Each 
‘system’ is defined and can be redefined as research projects are further designed. 
 For example, ‘national systems of innovation’ can be more or less systemic. The 
extent of systemness can be studied as an empirical question (Leydesdorff and Oomes 1999). 
Dynamic ‘system(s) of innovation’ may consist of increasingly complex collaborations across 
national borders and among researchers and users of research from various institutional 
spheres (Godin and Gingras 2000). Among other things, one may expect differences among 
regions (Braczyk et al. 1998) and sectors (Pavitt 1984).  
 All these systems of reference can be specified analytically, but their systemness 
remains a hypothesis (Leydesdorff 2000). The Triple Helix hypothesis states that the 
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‘systems’ can be expected to remain in transition (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1998). Can the 
observations then still provide us with an opportunity to update the expectations? 
 
 
THE STATUS OF THE OBSERVABLES 
 
 Non-linear models of innovation extend linear models by taking interactive and 
recursive terms into account. The non-linear terms can be expected to change the causal 
relations between input and output, that is, the production rules in the systems under study. 
The reflexivity in the discourses adds an emerging layer of learning to the evolving systems. 
The reflections remain structurally coupled to the actors involved as the carriers, but one 
subdynamics may be repressed (deselected) at the social level more than another given 
historical contingencies.  
 By changing the unit of analysis (or the unit of operation) reflexively, one is able to 
obtain a different perspective on the systems under study. But the latter are evolving at the 
same time. In terms of methodologies, this continuous change at various levels challenges our 
conceptual apparatus, since one is not always able to distinguish clearly whether a variable 
has changed (dx/dt = f(x)) or merely the relative value of the variable (y = f(x)).  
 Discursive analyses provide us with snapshots, while reality presents a moving 
picture. The analysts, however, need geometrical metaphors to render the complexity 
accessible to understanding and communication, and these metaphors can be stabilized by 
higher-order codifications, as in the case of paradigms. An understanding in terms of fluxes 
(that is, how the variables as well as the values change over time) calls for the use of a 
calculus and algorithmic simulations. The observables can then be considered as special cases 
that inform the expectations over time (Leydesdorff 1995). 
 The study of innovation systems requires this level of sophistication, since 
innovations can be defined only in terms of an operation which one can expect to contain 
both recursivity (stability) and interactivity (change). Knowledge-based innovation is 
therefore a cultural achievement: the innovators themselves are reflexive with respect to 
previous solutions. Both the innovator(s) and the innovated system(s) are expected to be 
changed by innovation. As noted, one is able to be both a participant and an observer, and 
one needs to be able to change these perspectives reflexively in order to maintain a position 
within the process. 
 Although the different narratives are mixed and confused in ‘real life’ events, the 
various models can be distinguished analytically. In his study of ‘artificial life’, Langton 
(1989) proposed to distinguish between a ‘phenotypical’ level of the observables and a 
‘genotypical’ level of analytical theorizing. The ‘phenotypes’ remain to be explained, while 
the various theories compete in terms of their ‘idealtypical’ clarity and their usefulness in 
updating the respective expectations. Confusion, however, is difficult to avoid given the ‘real 
life’ pressures to jump to conclusions. The different perspectives are continuously competing, 
both normatively and analytically. 
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EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The innovation systems under study can be expected to contain a complex dynamics 
and therefore, they do not have to be integrated nor completely differentiated. On the 
contrary, the delicate balance between integration and differentiation allows the system to 
further develop. Under selection pressure the innovation systems can be expected to perform 
on the edges of fractional differentiations and local integrations. Using this model of partial 
and temporary solutions, one can expect that the knowledge-based regime exhibits itself in 
terms of progressive instances and non-periodical crises.  
 The locally observable sequences inform us about global developments in terms of the 
deselected exceptions which can be replicated and built upon. The selection mechanisms, 
however, remain theoretical constructs. Historical case studies provide us with positive 
instances that enable the analyst to specify these (negative) selection mechanisms, but only 
reflexively. Over time, the initial inferences can perhaps be corroborated. At this end, the 
function of reflexive inferencing based on available and new theories moves the system 
forward by drawing attention to possibilities of (potentially counter-intuitive) change.  
 Reflexive translations can tolerate inconsistencies and differences to be resolved over 
time. The ensuing puzzles set a research agenda. In general, translations operate among 
different codifications. The exchanges at the interfaces enable us to transfer insights from one 
social domain to another by placing them in a different context, and thus by providing the 
substantive information with another meaning.  
 For example, in science one investigates whether a given statement is true or false, 
while in the economy one assesses whether one can utilize a finding (e.g., the patent) to make 
a profit. For the latter purpose, one does not always have to understand the underlying 
mechanism in great detail. However, one cannot buy the ‘truth’ of a statement on the market 
or claim it with only political power (Luhmann 1984).  
 When institutional differentiation (in the retention mechanism) is added to the 
functional differentiation in the exchange, the theoretical specification becomes one step 
more complex than before. The possibility of interaction increasingly adds a new dimension 
to the system. As noted, this expansion of the economy became urgent from 1870 onwards, 
when industrial R&D laboratories were installed and when patent legislation increasingly 
allowed for the transfer of insights from the laboratory into practice and vice versa. In 
principle, the two operations—of functional differentiation and institutional transfer—can 
operate as selectors upon each other, but only at certain places can resonances into 
coevolutions (‘mutual shapings’) be expected. Thus, in most places the options will not 
match, but, in a scattered and distributed mode, a new mode of knowledge production can 
increasingly be generated. The local resonances compete at a next-order systems level. In 
order to study this selection, however, this ‘virtual’ (next-order) system has first to be 
hypothesized and specified. 
 The communications can be valued systematically from different perspectives. In the 
case of an emerging network, each communication can have a meaning for systems other 
than the one in which it was generated. Since communications can be communicated, these 
networked systems generate internal complexities that require interface management. What 
competencies belong to which domains? As the organization of the interfaces and the control 
functions within them then also become degrees of freedom, the unambiguous attribution of a 
communication to either of the systems becomes increasingly difficult. 
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 A comparison may be helpful here: translations of texts into other languages can be 
unambiguous because the grammars and dictionaries of the various languages are codified. 
Thus, if one feels uncertain, one can look up the correct translation in a dictionary or one may 
ask a native speaker. The situation among functional domains, however, is one in which the 
translators are discussing about the proper translations among themselves. When the 
translators happen to agree, a new codification may be more useful than the ‘natural’ (that is, 
previously given) ones.  
 In a complex dynamics, each system remains under reconstruction and in evolutionary 
competition while reorganizing complexity within its relevant environments. Since all these 
systems are increasingly knowledge intensive, their borders remain uncertain expectations. 
New codifications reconstructed by the translations may then become more functional than 
the originally translated ones (or not).  
 First, the systematic use of science in industry in the late 19th century raised 
philosophical questions about the demarcation between science and non-science at the 
interfaces (Popper 1963). This issue was solved by the so-called ‘linguistic turn in the 
philosophy of science’ during the interbellum (Rorty 1992). While previously truth had been 
associated with ideas, a truth-value would henceforth be attributed to statements: some 
statements are more likely to be true than others.  
 The post-modern turn has changed the situation again: the truth-value of a statement 
is also contextual. One has a degree of freedom to play with the centrality of concepts in 
terms of heuristics and puzzle solving (Simon 1969). For example, the precise definition of 
‘atomic weight’ may differ between chemical physics and physical chemistry without 
necessarily creating confusion (Kuhn 1962). Concepts have meaning within discourses. 
Translations between discourses and reformulations within discourses can nowadays be 
considered as the carriers of knowledge-based developments. 
 This communicative turn implies neither arbitrariness in what is true or not, nor a 
relativistic position. The various values of a communication (including the potential truth) 
can only be discussed from within a discourse. These discourses are themselves developing 
and thus changing in terms of what is true or not. Although the discourse is uncertain in terms 
of its boundaries, it can also be expected to be more certain in terms of its core. Codifications 
structure the discourses, and translations enable us to communicate among them.  
 Note that the translations are asymmetrical. One cannot force validity upon a 
scientific discourse from a political perspective (Lecourt 1976). Analogously, the validity of a 
scientific statement does not guarantee its diffusion. The systems of reference have to be 
specified first, and then one can raise questions with respect to quality control in these 
various dimensions and the functions of the filters at interfaces.  
 For example, one can distinguish between (a) validation problems which are 
generated within the scientific communication system because of the differences between 
‘Mode 1’ and ‘Mode 2’ research, and (b) validation problems within the knowledge produced 
in the applicational contexts of ‘Mode 2’ (Fujigaki and Leydesdorff 2000). New mechanisms 
of quality control can sometimes be expected to emerge (for example, at the Internet). Thus, 
the new mode of the production of scientific knowledge can empirically be operationalized in 
terms of epistemological domains, that is, with reference to the validity of scientific 
knowledge in various contexts, yet without harming the standard conventions of scientific 
soundness in terms of true and false statements (Leydesdorff 2001b). 
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METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
 Since the reflexive selection mechanisms of cultural evolution cannot be identified by 
unmediated observation, the neo-evolutionary analysis has to begin with the specification of a 
hypothesis. ‘What’ does one expect to be communicated and why? The study of how this 
communication is institutionally arranged (and therefore measurable, in principle) is then a 
question of empirical design.  
 From this perspective, the observable arrangements have a status beyond merely 
providing the analyst with one or another, as yet unreflexive starting point for the narrative. 
The data can be used for informing ex ante—and sometimes testing ex post—the theoretical 
expectations. Which layer operated with which function, why and in which instances? By 
raising first the substantive question of ‘what is communicated?’—e.g., economic expecta-
tions (in terms of profit and growth), theoretical expectations or assessments of what can be 
realized given institutional and geographic constraints—the focus is firmly set on the 
specification of the media of communication. How are these media of exchange related and 
converted into one another? Why are some processes more mutually attractive than others, 
and under what conditions can the exchanges among them be sustained?  
 Although the discourses are able to interact at the interfaces, the frequency of such 
external interactions is (at least initially) lower than the frequency of interactions within each 
helix (Simon 1969). The helices communicate recursively over time first in terms of their 
own respective codes. Reflexively, they can sometimes take the role of each other, yet only to 
a certain extent. Over time and with the availability of ICT, this relation may begin to change 
(Cowan and Foray 1997). One can expect that the balance between spatial and virtual 
relations is contingent upon the availability of the exchange media and their respective 
codifications. The maintenance of codification may be costly, but it enables the systems to 
suppress noise in the communication. 
 Inter-human communication remains failure prone. Quality control of communication 
is crucial for developing the knowledge base of the system, but it remains a ‘counter-factual’ 
expectation. One experiences mainly the misfits between the various modes of 
communication. The selective operations can be specified with hindsight, that is, as 
hypotheses on the basis of theoretical inferences that recombine on the basis of insights in 
various disciplines. 
 Despite this ‘virtuality’ of the knowledge-based operation at the level of the overlay 
(Giddens 1984), the socio-economic system—that is potentially innovated by the operation—
is not ‘on the fly’: it remains also grounded in a culture which has to be reproduced in terms 
of renewing the social systems of coordination. However, the retention mechanisms are no 
longer given; the institutonal layer is increasingly ‘on the move.’ It can be reconstructed as 
the system is deconstructed, that is, as one of its subdynamics.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The emerging system rests like a hyper-network on the networks on which it builds 
(such as the disciplines, the industries, and the national governments), but the knowledge-
economy transforms ‘the ship while a storm is raging on the open sea’ (Neurath 1933). As the 
technological culture provides options for recombination, the boundaries of the carrying 
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communities can also be reconstituted. The price of changing the communal base may be felt 
as a loss of traditional identities, alienation, or as a concern with the sustainability of the 
reconstruction. However, ‘creative destruction’ entails the option of increasing development. 
In this sense, knowledge-based innovation can be turned into ‘a celebration of community’ 
because the new mode of production is based on reaching across previously established 
boundaries (Hayward 1998).  
 I have argued that the evolutionary perspective in economics can be complemented 
with a turn towards reflexivity in sociology in order to obtain a richer understanding of how 
the overlay of communications in university-industry-government relations reshapes the 
systems of innovations that are currently subjects of debate, policy-making, and scientific 
study. Without this reflexive turn, evolutionary studies tend to reify systems like ‘national 
systems of innovation,’ ‘regional innovation systems,’ or sectors of the economy. Both 
participants and analysts, however, can always redefine systems. Furthermore, the 
participants and the analysts use their system’s definition in studying and changing the 
system. 
 Whereas a coevolution between, for example, markets and technologies can be 
entrained along a trajectory, a triple helix of university-industry-government relations can no 
longer be expected to stabilize. The global regime may contain competing trajectories. The 
analyst can hypothesize and then also try to measure whether a technological development 
(e.g., aircraft) is in its trajectory phase or in the regime phase (e.g., Frenken and Leydesdorff 
2000). In the regime phase, knowledge-based innovation policies should be aimed at 
influencing the political economy of a technology at the regime level and not merely at 
addressing the trajectory of its further improvements. 
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